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ENUMERATING THE NASH EQUILIBRIA OF RANK 1-GAMES
THORSTEN THEOBALD
Abstract. A bimatrix game (A,B) is called a game of rank k if the rank of the matrix
A + B is at most k. We consider the problem of enumerating the Nash equilibria in
(non-degenerate) games of rank 1. In particular, we show that even for games of rank 1
not all equilibria can be reached by a Lemke-Howson path and present a parametric
simplex-type algorithm for enumerating all Nash equilibria of a non-degenerate game of
rank 1.
1. Introduction
Bimatrix games belong to the fundamental concepts of game theory. A bimatrix game
is given by two payoff matrices (A,B), and by Nash’s results any bimatrix game has at
least one equilibrium [17, 19]. The problem of computing a Nash equilibrium (named
by Papadimitriou in 2001 to be the most concrete open question on the boundary of the
complexity class P [20]) has received much attention in the last years. Chen and Deng
recently showed that the problem is PPAD-complete [3] and (together with Teng [4])
that the problem of computing a 1/nΘ(1)-approximate Nash equilibrium remains PPAD-
complete. Thus it is unlikely that an efficient algorithm exists.
The corresponding enumeration problem asks to enumerate all equilibria (in the finite
case) or all the extreme equilibria (in the degenerate case where an infinite number of Nash
equilibria is possible). The enumeration problem is similar to (but more difficult than)
enumerating the vertices of a polyhedron given as the intersection of half-spaces. In the
latter vertex enumeration problem, the Upper Bound Theorem gives a tight estimate for
the maximal number of vertices, but the analogous problem of determining the maximum
number of Nash equilibria of a bimatrix game is an open problem (see [22, 23]).
For the special case of zero-sum games, the set of Nash equilibria defines a polyhedral
set in the strategy space, and the problem of computing the set of all Nash equilibria is
equivalent to linear programming (see [6, Ch. 13.2]). Hence, for a non-degenerate zero-
sum game, the set of Nash equilibria consists of a single point, and thus the enumeration
problem becomes trivial.
Recently, Kannan and Theobald [9] have introduced a hierarchy of bimatrix games in
which the matrix A + B is restricted to be of rank at most k, for some fixed constant k.
For any fixed k ≥ 1, this class strictly generalizes the class of zero sum-games. Of course,
the case k = 1 is of particular importance; it is the smallest extension of zero-sum games
in the hierarchy.
In contrast to zero-sum games, non-degenerate rank k-games (for any fixed k ≥ 1)
can have an arbitrarily large number of equilibria. In particular, this provides a sharp
separation between the class of rank 1-games and the class of zero-sum games. From
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the computational viewpoint, Nash equilibria can be efficiently approximated in games
of fixed rank, but the question of exact polynomial time computability is open even for
games of rank 1.
In this paper, we consider the enumeration problem for games of rank 1. Similar to the
situation above, the rank condition provides additional structure which can be exploited.
An initial question is whether any equilibrium can be reached by a Lemke-Howson path
(as defined formally in Section 3). For arbitrary bimatrix games Aggarwal has shown that
in general not all equilibria can be reached by a Lemke-Howson path [1]. By providing
an example of a rank 1-game for which not all equilibria can be reached in this way, we
strengthen Aggarwal’s result and thus answer our initial question in the negative.
As main contribution of the paper, we propose a parametric simplex-type algorithm for
enumerating the Nash equilibria of rank 1-games. This algorithm is based on the tech-
niques of Konno and Kuno who have investigated linear multiplicative programs ([10],
see also [11]). Our problem can be seen as an enumeration problem of generalized lin-
ear multiplicative programming. Moreover, the situation of games provides additional
combinatorial structure which can be exploited.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the basic concepts of
bimatrix games as well as of rank k-games and review existing work on the enumeration
of Nash equilibria. In Section 3, we show that not all equilibria can be reached by a
Lemke-Howson path in a rank 1-game. Then, in Section 4, we present the parametric
simplex-type algorithm for enumerating the Nash equilibria of a non-degenerate rank 1-
game; finally, we explain how to modify the algorithm so as to cover degenerate situations
as well.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Bimatrix games. We consider anm×n-bimatrix game with payoff matrices A,B ∈
R
m×n. Let
S1 =
{
x ∈ Rm :
m∑
i=1
xi = 1 , x ≥ 0
}
and S2 =
{
y ∈ Rn :
n∑
j=1
yj = 1 , y ≥ 0
}
be the sets of mixed strategies of the two players, and let S1 = {x ∈ R
m :
∑m
i=1 xi = 1}
and S2 = {y ∈ R
n :
∑n
j=1 yj = 1} denote the underlying affine subspaces. The first
player (the row player) plays x ∈ S1 and the second player (the column player) plays
y ∈ S2. The payoffs for player 1 and player 2 are x
TAy and xTBy, respectively.
Let C(i) denote the i-th row of a matrix C (as a row vector), and let C(j) denote the j-th
column of C (as a column vector). A pair of mixed strategies (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium
if
(2.1) xTAy ≥ xTAy and xTBy ≥ xTBy
for all mixed strategies x, y. Equivalently, (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
(2.2) xTAy = max
1≤i≤m
A(i)y and xTBy = max
1≤j≤n
xTB(j) .
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A bimatrix game is called non-degenerate if the number of the pure best responses of
player 1 to a mixed strategy y of player 2 never exceeds the cardinality of the support
supp y := {j : yj 6= 0} and if the same holds true for the best pure responses of player 2
(see [23]). In the case of a non-degenerate game the set of Nash equilibria consists of
finitely many isolated points. We remark that there exist various other definitions of
degeneracy in the literature which are equivalent to that notion (see [23, Theorem 2.10]).
2.2. Earlier work on enumeration of equilibria. The classical Lemke-Howson algo-
rithm serves to find one Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game ([12], see also [23]). We
discuss this algorithm and its (negative) relation to enumeration in more detail in Sec-
tion 3.
From the viewpoint of computational complexity, the problem of counting the number
of Nash equilibria in a bimatrix game is #P-hard [5]. Hence, the enumeration problem is
#P-hard.
The general idea of existing approaches for the enumeration of Nash equilibria is to
transform the problem into a problem of polyhedral computation. For each game we
define a pair of polyhedra in which each Nash equilibrium of the game corresponds to a
complementary vertex pair.
Definition 2.1. For an m× n-bimatrix game (A,B), define the polyhedra P and Q by
P = {(x, π2) ∈ R
m × R : x ≥ 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
inequalities 1,...,m
, xTB ≤ 1Tπ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
inequalities m+1,...,m+n
, 1Tx = 1} ,(2.3)
Q = {(y, π1) ∈ R
n × R : Ay ≤ 1π1︸ ︷︷ ︸
inequalities 1,...,m
, y ≥ 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
inequalities m+1,...,m+n
, 1Ty = 1} ,(2.4)
where 1 is the all-1-vector.
A pair of mixed strategies (x, y) ∈ S1 × S2 is a Nash equilibrium if and only if there
exist π1, π2 ∈ R such that (x, π2) ∈ P , (y, π1) ∈ Q and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , m + n}, the
i-th inequality of P or Q is binding. Here, π1 and π2 represent the payoffs of player 1
and player 2, respectively. For i ∈ {1, . . . , m} we call the inequality xi ≥ 0 the i-th
nonnegativity inequality of P , and for j ∈ {1, . . . , n} we call the inequality xTB(j) ≤ π2
the j-th best response inequality of P . And analogously for Q.
Example 2.2. (Taken from [24]). The bimatrix game with payoff matrices
A =
(
2 1 5
3 0 4
)
, B =
(
7 8 1
2 1 6
)
has 3 Nash equilibria:(
(1, 0)T , (0, 1, 0)T
)
,
((
1
2
,
1
2
)T
,
(
1
2
,
1
2
, 0
)T)
,
((
2
5
,
3
5
)T
,
(
1
2
, 0,
1
2
)T)
.
The polyhedra P and Q are shown in Figure 1.
The situation becomes more involved when one also wants to handle degenerate games.
For an arbitrary bimatrix game, the set of all Nash equilibria is in general a non-convex
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pi2
1
(1, 0) (0, 1)( 1
2
, 1
2
) ( 2
5
, 3
5
)
Figure 1. In the example, P is a two-dimensional polyhedron embedded in
S1, and Q is a three-dimensional polyhedron embedded in S2. The vertical
direction corresponds to the variables π2 and π1, respectively.
subset, but can be represented as the union of a finite number of polytopes (called maximal
Nash subsets) in the strategy space (see [15]). Hence, in the degenerate situation, the
task is to enumerate all vertices of every maximal Nash subset of a bimatrix game. Every
equilibrium point is a convex combination of some of these extreme equilibria (cf. [8, 26]).
These concepts can be used to provide algorithms for enumerating Nash equilibria of
bimatrix games. The earliest ones can be found in Vorob’ev [25] and Mangasarian [13]; for
later developments see Mukhamediev [18], Winkels [26], and Audet, Hansen, Jaumard,
and Sauvard [2]. The latter paper also contains a detailed historical account on these
algorithms.
2.3. Games of fixed rank. For a given constant k ≥ 0, a bimatrix game is called a
game of rank k if the matrix A +B has rank at most k.
Kannan and Theobald have shown that for any fixed k ≥ 1, the number of Nash
equilibria in a non-degenerate game of rank k cannot be bounded by a function in terms
of k [9]. In particular, the case k = 1 stands in sharp contrast to the case k = 0 of
zero-sum games; there, the number of Nash equilibria in the finite situation is always 1.
For the case d := m = n, the best known lower bound for the maximal number of Nash
equilibria of rank 1-games is linear in d:
Proposition 2.3. For any d ∈ N there exists a non-degenerate d×d-game of rank 1 with
at least 2d− 1 Nash equilibria.
A construction achieving this number is given by the d× d-game (A,B) with
(2.5) aij = 2ij − i
2 + j2 , bij = 2ij + i
2 − j2
(see [9]). Since A+B = (4ij)i,j, the matrix A+B is of rank 1.
It is not known whether in games of fixed rank a Nash equilibrium can be computed
in polynomial time. In [9], the following approximation result was shown. Here, a pair
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(x, y) of mixed strategies is called an ε-approximate equilibrium if
ℓ(x, y) ≤ ε|A+B| ,
where ℓ(x, y) denotes the sum of the losses of the players,
ℓ(x, y) = max
i
A(i)y +max
j
xTB(j) − x
T (A+B)y ,
and | · | denotes the maximum absolute value of the entries of a matrix.
Proposition 2.4. Let k be a fixed constant and ε > 0. In a game of rank k, an ε-
approximate Nash equilibrium can be found in time poly(L, 1/ε), where L is the bit length
of the input.
There are several operations on a bimatrix game (A,B) which do not change the set of
Nash equilibria:
(1) adding multiples of the all-1-vector to a given column of A or a given row of B ;
(2) positive scaling of a given column of A or a given row of B .
Since these operations can change the rank of the game, the following useful consequence
is obtained.
Lemma 2.5. Let (A,B) be a d × d-game of rank d. Then there exists a game of rank
d− 1 with the same set of Nash equilibria.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that d ≥ 2 and that C := A + B is of rank
exactly d. Then there exists a column j of C which is not a multiple of the all-1-vector.
Denote by v the column vector obtained from the entries of the j-th column of C. Since
the affine line v + R(1, . . . , 1)T intersects the (d− 1)-dimensional linear subspace defined
by the d− 1 other columns, there exists some λ ∈ R such that adding λ(1, . . . , 1)T to the
j-th column of C yields a matrix of rank at most d− 1. Thus, adding λ(1, . . . , 1)T to the
j-th column of A turns the game (A,B) into a game of rank d− 1. 
3. Lemke-Howson paths
In this section, we recall the classical Lemke-Howson algorithm for finding a Nash
equilibrium in a bimatrix game and then show that not even for games of rank 1 all
equilibria can be reached by a Lemke-Howson path.
The Lemke-Howson algorithm is a simplex-type algorithm which can be combinatorially
described in terms of a graph. In order to define this graph, we start from the polyhedral
description of the bimatrix game in terms of P and Q. Consider a pair of strategies
(x, y) ∈ S1×S2, and let π1 and π2 be the resulting payoffs. We label each of the strategies
x and y by the indices of the inequalities in (2.3) and (2.4) that are binding. For a
non-degenerate m × n-game, only the vertices of P have m labels and the vertices of Q
have n labels, and there do not exist points in P and Q with more than m or n labels,
respectively (see [23, Theorem 2.7]).
We define the graphs G1 = (V1, E1) and G2 = (V2, E2) as follows. The vertex set V1
of G1 consists of the vertices of P , with an additional vertex 0 ∈ R
m that has all labels
in the set {1, . . . , m}. Two vertices x and x′ are connected by an edge if they differ in
6 THORSTEN THEOBALD
exactly one label, i.e., if they have m−1 labels in common. Similarly, let G2 be the graph
whose vertex set V2 consists of the vertices of Q, with an additional vertex 0 ∈ R
n having
all labels in {m + 1, . . . , m + n}. Two vertices in G2 are connected if they have n − 1
labels in common.
The product graph G1 × G2 of G1 and G2 is defined by the vertex set V1 × V2, and
the edges are given by {x} × {y, y′} for vertices x of G1 and edges {y, y
′} of G2, or by
{x, x′} × {y} for edges {x, x′} of G1 and vertices y of G2.
From a combinatorial viewpoint, the Lemke-Howson algorithm can now be described
as follows. Fix an r ∈ {1, . . . , m + n}. A vertex (x, y) of G1 × G2 is called r-almost
completely labeled if the union of the labels is the set {1, . . . , m + n} \ {r}. Since two
adjacent vertices x and x′ in G1 have m − 1 common labels, the edge {x, x
′} × {y} of
G1×G2 is also r-almost completely labeled if y has the remaining n labels except r. And
similarly for edges {x}×{y, y′} of G1×G2. The Lemke-Howson algorithm starts from the
artificial equilibrium (0, 0) which has all labels and then follows the unique path where the
label r is missing. After finitely many steps, it reaches a Nash equilibrium of the game.
For different choices of r it is possible that we reach different Nash equilibria. This led
to the early question in the algorithmic study of games on whether any equilibrium can be
reached by a Lemke-Howson path, i.e., by some choice of r. For general bimatrix games
it is known that the set of Lemke-Howson paths does not enumerate all Nash equilibria
(Aggarwal [1]; see also [23] and the references therein).
Since games of rank 1 are a very special case of general bimatrix games, the question
arises whether for a game of rank 1 all equilibria can be reached by a Lemke-Howson path.
Here, we strengthen the (un-)reachability result by showing that even for games of rank 1
not all equilibria can be reached. Namely, we consider the rank 1-game
A =
(
−28 −18
−8 −23
)
, B =
(
10 30
20 15
)
,
which is a variation of Aggarwal’s example resulting from Lemma 2.5. The polyhedra P
and Q are shown in Figure 2.
pi2
pi2 = 16
(1, 0) (0, 1)( 1
5
, 4
5
)
2, 4
3, 4
1, 3
18
20
30
pi1
pi1 = −22
(1, 0) (0, 1)( 1
5
, 4
5
)
2, 4
1, 2
1, 3
−8
−18
−20
Figure 2. The polyhedra P and Q and the labels of the vertices.
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The game has three Nash equilibria:(
(1, 0)T , (0, 1)T
)
, with payoffs (−18, 30) ;(
(0, 1)T , (1, 0)T
)
, with payoffs (−8, 20) ;
and
(
(1
5
, 4
5
)T , (1
5
, 4
5
)T
)
, with payoffs (−20, 18) .
With regard to the Lemke-Howson graphs, the locally maximal peaks of the lower hull
of P are connected with the 0-vertex (which has labels 1, 2) and the maximal peaks in the
lower hull of Q are connected with the 0-vertex (which has labels 3, 4). Considering all the
four possible values of r, only the first two equilibria can be obtained via Lemke-Howson
paths, and the third equilibrium cannot be obtained. E.g., for the initial missing label
r = 1 we obtain the following path with labels. Here, the two components correspond to
the graphs G1 and G2. (
1, 2
3, 4
)
→
(
2, 4
3, 4
)
→
(
2, 4
1, 3
)
,
where the last vertex pair gives the Nash equilibrium ((1, 0)T , (0, 1)T ). Hence we can
conclude:
Theorem 3.1. There exist games of rank 1 for which not all equilibria can be reached by
a Lemke-Howson path.
Let G′ be the graph with vertex set V1 × V2 whose edge set is the union (over all r)
of r-almost completely labeled edges. In a paper of Shapley [21], the following example
attributed to Wilson is given which shows that for games of arbitrary rank the graph G′
can even be disconnected. Let the 3× 3-game (A,B) be defined by
A =

 0 3 02 2 0
3 0 1

 , B =

 0 2 33 2 0
0 0 1

 .
(1, 0, 0)
2, 3, 6
(0, 1, 0)
1, 3, 4
(0, 0, 1) 1, 2, 6
3, 5, 6 3, 4, 5
1, 4, 6
4, 5, 6
6
5
4
(1, 0, 0)
3, 5, 6
(0, 1, 0)
1, 4, 6
(0, 0, 1) 3, 4, 5
2, 3, 6 1, 2, 6
1, 3, 4
1, 2, 3
3
2
1
Figure 3. The projections of the polyhedra P and Q in Wilson’s exam-
ples. The picture contains the labels of the points with three labels. The
underlined numbers show the best responses of the regions.
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In the graph G′, the mixed equilibrium of (A,B) cannot be reached from the artificial
equilibrium. Hence, even modifications of the Lemke-Howson-algorithm which are allowed
to change the index of the missing label within the graph traversal cannot enumerate all
Nash equilibria.
Applying the rank reduction Lemma 2.5 on Wilson’s example immediately implies that
for 3 × 3-games of rank 2, the graph G′ can be disconnected. It would be interesting to
know if this graph can also be disconnected for the case of rank 1-games. While from the
principle viewpoint this question is decidable, currently we do not know the answer.
4. A parametric algorithm for enumerating all Nash equilibria of
rank 1-games
In this section, we present a parametric simplex-type enumeration algorithm for games
of rank 1. For simplicity we concentrate on the situation where the game is non-degenerate
and the polytopes P and Q are in general position. In Section 4.2 we explain how to
modify the algorithm to cover degenerate situations as well. An example is presented in
Section 4.3.
4.1. Non-degenerate situations. We consider the following well-known characteriza-
tion of a Nash equilibrium in terms of a quadratic program [14]. For any (x, π2) ∈ P and
(y, π1) ∈ Q, we have
xT (A+B)y ≤ max
1≤i≤m
A(i)x+ max
1≤j≤n
xTB(j) ≤ π1 + π2
with equality if and only (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium with payoffs π1 and π2. Consider
the quadratic program
(4.1)
(QP :) max xT (A+B)y − π1 − π2
(x, π2) ∈ P ,
(y, π1) ∈ Q .
Hence, we obtain the following characterization of the Nash equilibria in terms of the
quadratic program.
Lemma 4.1. 1) For any feasible solution of QP, the objective value is nonpositive.
2) A pair (x∗, y∗) ∈ S1×S2 is a Nash equilibrium of the bimatrix game (A,B) if and only
if there exist π∗1, π
∗
2 ∈ R such that (x
∗, y∗, π∗1, π
∗
2) is a feasible solution of QP with objective
value 0.
Note that the inequalities describing the feasible set are linear. Moreover, the objective
function only depends on the sum A+B rather than on A or B individually.
If the game is of rank 1, we write A + B in the form A + B = b · cT with b ∈ Rm,
c ∈ Rn. That is, after a linear variable transformation we want to enumerate the global
optima of a function of the form f + g where f is the product of two variables and g is a
linear function. The problem of optimizing a product of two variables over a polyhedron is
called a linear multiplicative program ([10], see also [11]). In these references, parametric
primal-dual simplex-type algorithms were presented to find the optimal value. Based on
these techniques, we now present an algorithm which enumerates all equilibria of a rank
ENUMERATING THE NASH EQUILIBRIA OF RANK 1-GAMES 9
1-game. Since we are starting from a game, we will see below that the relevant bases have
a special combinatorial structure, where m elements of the basis refer to the polyhedron P
and n− 1 elements refer to the polyhedron Q.
By setting ξ := cTy, we can write the quadratic program as
(4.2)
max (xT b)ξ − π1 − π2
(x, π2) ∈ P ,
(y, π1) ∈ Q ,
cTy = ξ .
We consider ξ as a parameter to the optimization problem. For a given value to ξ, the
problem becomes a linear program which we call LP(ξ). Geometrically, for fixed ξ we are
slicing the feasible set polyhedron by a hyperplane cTy = ξ on which the strategy of the
second player satisfies a particular linear condition.
Remark 4.2. In the special case where c is a multiple of the all-1-vector, the hyperplane
defined by cTy = ξ is parallel to the hyperplane defined by 1Ty = 1 (which is part of
the definition of Q). In that situation, all columns of A + B are identical, and games of
this type are called row-constant games (see [7]). We will come back to that special case
below.
The feasible set of (4.1) is unbounded. However, since y ∈ S2 the range [ξmin, ξmax] of
ξ is bounded, namely
(4.3) [ξmin, ξmax] = [min
y∈S2
cTy,max
y∈S2
cTy] = [ min
1≤j≤n
cj, max
1≤j≤n
cj] .
Even for fixed ξ, the feasible region of LP(ξ) can be unbounded. But by Lemma 4.1,
the objective value of QP is bounded from above and hence also LP(ξ) is bounded from
above.
Let I := {1, . . . , m,m + 1, . . . , m + n} be the index set of the inequalities of P , and
J := {1, . . . , m,m+ 1, . . . , m+ n} be the index set of the inequalities of Q.
We consider a fixed parameter value ξ. If the resulting LP(ξ) is in general position,
then the optimal point v of LP(ξ) is unique and v is a vertex of the feasible set polyhedron
of LP(ξ). If ξ is a sufficiently generic value (we will come back to this aspect below) then
v can be uniquely described in terms of a basis, i.e., by a choice I ⊂ I of cardinality m
and J ⊂ J of cardinality n− 1.
For a given ξ, let (I, J) denote an optimal basis for the linear program LP(ξ) depending
on ξ. The idea of the enumeration algorithm is to keep track on the values of ξ where the
optimal basis changes. This yields the enumeration algorithm in Figure 4.
In order to explain how the update steps can be performed efficiently, we analyze the
set of the values of the parameter ξ which yield the same optimal basis. For this, we
consider the dual program of the parametric LP (4.2).
Let ui be the dual variable corresponding to the i-th inequality of P , 1 ≤ i ≤ m + n,
and um+n+j be the dual variable corresponding to the j-th inequality of Q, 1 ≤ j ≤ m+n.
Further let u2(m+n)+1 and u2(m+n)+2 be the dual variables of the equations 1
Tx = 1 and
1Ty = 1, and u2(m+n)+3 be the dual variable of the equation c
Ty = ξ. The dual variables
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Set ξ = ξmin;
While ξ ≤ ξmax do
Compute the optimal point z := z(ξ) of LP(ξ);
If z(ξ) has objective value 0 then
Let x, y be the strategies played in z(ξ);
Output “Nash equilibrium:”, x, y ;
Compute the smallest ξ′ > ξ where the optimal basis changes and the new optimal basis;
Figure 4. Enumeration algorithm
u1, . . . , u2(m+n) are sign-restricted while the dual variables u2(m+n)+1, . . . , u2(m+n)+3 are
not.
We set z = (x, y, π1, π2) and the constants K = 2(m + n) and N = m + n + 2. Let
M1 ∈ R
K×N and e1 ∈ R
K be defined by
M1 =


−I
BT −1
A −1
−I

 , e1 = 0 .
Further, let M2 ∈ R
3×N and e2 ∈ R
3 be defined by
M2 =

 1T 1T
cT

 , e2 =

 11
ξ

 .
Then the feasible region of the linear program LP(ξ) is given by M1z ≤ e1, M2z = e2.
For fixed ξ, the dual of LP(ξ) is
min (eT1 , e
T
2 )u
(MT1 |M
T
2 )u = (b1ξ, . . . , bmξ, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
,−1,−1)T ,
u1, . . . , uK ≥ 0 ,
where u = (u1, . . . , uK+3) is the vector of dual variables.
By the complementary slackness conditions for linear programming, the optimal solu-
tion of the dual program satisfies
(4.4) ui = 0 for all i 6∈ I and um+n+j = 0 for all j 6∈ J .
A basis (I, J) of LP(ξ) is also an optimal basis for all those programs LP(ξ′) for which
the point described by (I, J) is feasible and for which there exists a feasible solution to
the dual program satisfying the complementarity condition (4.4).
For the special case of a zero-sum game, the parametric formulation degenerates to the
well-known pair of dual linear programs associated with the game. Namely, if b = c = 0
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then ξmin = ξmax = 0 and the matrix M1 becomes
M1 =


−I
(−A)T −1
A −1
−I

 .
For ξ = 0, the dual then becomes
min uK+1 + uK+2
s.t.


−I −A 1
AT −I 1
−1T
−1T

u =


0
0
−1
−1

 ,
u1, . . . , uK ≥ 0 .
Hence we can conclude:
Lemma 4.3. If the game is a zero-sum game (i.e., A + B = 0) then the parametric
problem (4.2) is only feasible for ξ = 0. In this case, the constraints of the dual LP
coincide with the constraints of the primal program under the identifications xi = um+n+i,
1 ≤ i ≤ m, yj = um+j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, π1 = u2(m+n)+2, π2 = u2(m+n)+1, and considering
u1, . . . , um and u2m+n+1, . . . , uK as slack variables; the objective functions are additive
inverses under these identifications.
Similarly, for row-constant games the range of ξ-values consists of a single point, and
the equilibria of these games can be phrased as linear programs. Namely, if there exist
constants u1, . . . , um ∈ R with
aij + bij = ui for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n
then the zero-sum game (A′, B′) defined by b′ij = bij − ui has the same Nash equilibria
as (A,B).
From now on, let the game (A,B) neither be a zero-sum game nor a row-constant game.
Let (I, J) be an optimal basis of LP(ξ) for some parameter value ξ. Let B = I ∪ J , and
for a matrix A let AB be the submatrix of A with rows in B. By our assumption, the
system of linear equations
(M1)Bz = (e1)B ,(4.5)
M2z = e2(4.6)
has a unique solution. Let z(ξ) be the solution point of this system. In order to check
whether there exists a dual solution satisfying the complementary slackness conditions,
set B′ = B ∪ {K + 1, K + 2, K + 3}. Compute
((M1)
T
B′|M
T
2 )
−1(b1ξ, . . . , bmξ, 0, . . . , 0,−1,−1)
T
and set all components of u indexed by {1, . . . , 2K}\B to zero to obtain a vector u = u(ξ)
with (MT1 |M
T
2 )u(ξ) = (b1ξ, . . . , bmξ, 0, . . . , 0,−1,−1)
T and which satisfies the complemen-
tarity conditions.
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Lemma 4.4. Let z(ξ) be defined by solving (4.5) and (4.6) for z and u(ξ) be as described
before. The set of ξ such that B is an optimal basis of LP(ξ) is given by the two conditions
M1z(ξ) ≤ e1 ,(4.7)
u1(ξ), . . . , uK(ξ) ≥ 0 .(4.8)
Proof. The first condition is satisfied if and only if z(ξ) is feasible. For a vertex z(ξ) of
the feasible set polyhedron the second condition is satisfied if and only if z(ξ) is optimal
for LP(ξ). 
For a variable ξ, both conditions in (4.7) and (4.8) are linear conditions in ξ. Hence, the
range of ξ-values in which both conditions are satisfied defines an interval. Let [α1, α2]
and [β1, β2] be the intervals defined by (4.7) and (4.8), respectively. Then [ξ1, ξ2] :=
[max{α1, β1},min{α2, β2}] is the interval for ξ in which both conditions are satisfied.
Since (I, J) is an optimal basis for some ξ, the interval is nonempty. We distinguish two
cases:
Case ξ2 = α2. Then for the value ξ = ξ2, there are m + n inequalities, indexed by
B ∪ {j} for some j, which are binding in the primal program. One of the inequalities i of
the current vector z(ξ) becomes violated for ξ > ξ2. We remove the index i from B and
replace it by the index j. Since i was chosen to be the earliest violated inequality, after
this dual simplex step the new basis defines a feasible and optimal point for sufficiently
small ξ > ξ2.
From the viewpoint of the game, we can distinguish the following subcases correspond-
ing to the set of m+ n active inequalities.
(1) m+ 1 inequalities for x and n− 1 inequalities for y are binding.
Then i and j refer to indices of inequalities for the polyhedron P . If i ∈
{1, . . . , m} then one of the unplayed pure strategies of the first player is now
effectively played. If i ∈ {m + 1, . . . , m + n} then one of the previous best pure
responses of the second player becomes a suboptimal response.
If j ∈ {1, . . . , m} then one of the played pure strategies of the first player
becomes unplayed. If j ∈ {m+1, . . . , m+n} then one of the previous suboptimal
pure responses of the second player becomes a best response.
(2) m inequalities for x and n inequalities for y are binding.
Then i and j refer to indices of inequalities for the polyhedron Q. If i ∈
{1, . . . , m} then one of the previous best pure responses of the first player be-
comes a suboptimal response. If i ∈ {m+ 1, . . . , m+ n} then one of the unplayed
pure strategies of the second player is now effectively played.
If j ∈ {1, . . . , m} then one of the previous suboptimal pure responses of the first
player becomes a best response. If j ∈ {m+ 1, . . . , m+ n} then one of the played
pure strategies of the second player becomes unplayed.
Case ξ2 = β2. Then for the value ξ = ξ2 there exists an index i ∈ B such that the dual
variable yi becomes zero. For ξ > ξ2 the current vector z(ξ) is no longer optimal. We
remove the index i from the basis and perform a simplex step moving along an edge of
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the polyhedron. Since i was chosen to be the earliest violated optimality condition, this
simplex step gives a new optimal basis B′.
We conclude:
Theorem 4.5. Let (A,B) be a non-degenerate bimatrix game of rank 1. Then the para-
metric algorithm enumerates all Nash equilibria. The running time of the algorithm is
polynomial in the product f0(P ) · f0(Q), where f0(P ) and f0(Q) denote the number of
vertices of P and Q respectively.
Proof. For those parameter values ξ where the basis does not change, the optimal basis
is given by an m-element subset I ⊂ I corresponding to a vertex of P and by an (n− 1)-
element subset J ⊂ J that can be extended to an n-element subset characterizing a vertex
of Q. 
As mentioned in Section 2 note that in general not every vertex pair of P and Q
corresponds to a Nash equilibrium.
4.2. Degenerate games. If the game is degenerate then there are two issues. The
polyhedra might not be simple and the number of Nash equilibria can become infinite. In
order to resolve the first of these points, we have to cope with the same issues as in the
case of the simplex algorithm (in particular, the issue of possible cycling when changing
a basis). However, with the same techniques as for linear programming (such as symbolic
perturbation, lexicographic ordering), these situations can be resolved.
In order to extend the algorithm to degenerate games with an infinite number of equi-
libria as well, by Section 2.2 the extreme equilibria are sufficient to determine all maximal
Nash subsets. Indeed, our method can be modified to find all extreme equilibria even in
degenerate cases.
4.3. Example. We consider the rank 1-game from (2.5) for d = 2:
A =
(
2 7
1 8
)
, B =
(
2 1
7 8
)
;
i.e., A+B = bcT with b = (2, 4)T , c = (2, 4)T . We have miny∈S2 c
T y = 2 and maxy∈S2 c
Ty =
4. For the value of ξ = 2, the inequalities with indices in {2, 3, 5, 8} are binding.
ξ = cTy objective binding
2 0 {2, 3, 5, 8}
ξ ∈ (2, 5
2
) < 0 {2, 3, 5}
5
2
−1
4
{2, 3, 4, 5}
ξ ∈ (5
2
, 3) < 0 {3, 4, 5}
3 0 {3, 4, 5, 6}
ξ ∈ (3, 7
2
) < 0 {3, 4, 6}
7
2
−1
4
{1, 3, 4, 6}
ξ ∈ (7
2
, 4) < 0 {1, 4, 6}
4 0 {1, 4, 6, 7}
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For ξ = 5
2
, in the optimal situation we obtain uniquely y = (3
4
, 1
4
) and π1 =
13
4
. The
optimal values for x and π2 are not unique; by substituting x2 = 1 − x1 we can analyze
the situation locally around the parameter value ξ = 5
2
in the (x1, π2)-plane (see Figure 5;
but note that the x and y-axis are scaled differently). The induced optimization problem
is
max (−2x1 + 4)ξ − π2 −
13
4
0 ≤ x1 ≤ 1 , (1, 2)
−5x1 + 7 ≤ π2 , (3)
−7x1 + 8 ≤ π2 . (4)
For ξ = 5
2
the objective function is −5x1 − π2 +
27
4
, so that both points p1 := (1, 2)
T
and p2 := (
1
2
, 9
2
)T (as well as all convex combinations) are optimal. The first one comes
from the basis {2, 3, 5} and the second one from the basis {3, 4, 5}. For some sufficiently
small ε, in the case of ξ = 5
2
− ε, the first of these bases is optimal, and in the case of
ξ = 5
2
+ ε the second of these bases is optimal.
1
1
x1
pi2
(3)
(4) (2)
p1
p2
Figure 5. The situation for ξ = 5
2
. Since the x1- and π2-axes are scaled
differently, the outer normal vectors to the lines do not look orthogonal in
the figure.
5. Conclusion and outlook
We have presented an enumeration algorithm for the Nash equilibria of non-degenerate
rank 1-games which is adapted to the rank 1-structure. Our running time estimate was
based on bounding the number of vertices of the polyhedra involved. An open question
is in how far one can improve the running time analysis of the algorithm.
A widely open question is to develop enumeration algorithms for games of rank k (for
fixed k ∈ N) exploiting the low-rank structure.
Acknowledgments. Thanks to the reviewers for very helpful comments and corrections.
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